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  1 
The Ends of Justice: Climate Vulnerability beyond the Pale (pre-proof 
version) 
 
Michael Mason 
 
It was the fifth successive year of drought in Yatta District, with the winter rains yielding 
180mm - 40% of average annual totals for the arid landscape of the Hebron hills, which fill 
out the southern edge of the West Bank. Abdallah Al Tabaneh gestured at his herd of 140 
sheep and goats, complaining that the parched rangelands has supported only 15 days of 
grazing that season, such that he was forced to buy concentrated feed and tankered water 
for his animals. At the time of our conversation, in May 2009, he was paying 50 New Israeli 
Shekels (NIS) a month (almost US $13) for 2500 litres of water and facing concentrated 
feed prices in excess of 2000 NIS (US $510) a metric ton. The rain-fed barley and wheat 
that traditionally provided fodder for the Bedouin herds was stunted, increasingly overrun 
by spiny shrubs unpalatable even to goats. For Abdallah the recurrent drought was 
unprecedented in the living memory of the 500 Bedouin households of this region, with 
profits from herding plummeting. Yet herd sizes had increased significantly in the past ten 
years (with sheep numbers tripling to 90,000 in 2008), as non-Bedouin households turned 
to small ruminants breeding to cope economically in the face of Israeli movement 
restrictions. Since the onset of the Second Intifada in 2000, Israeli work permits had been 
very difficult to obtain for West Bank Palestinians.1 
 
In the nearby village of At-Tuwani, the 240 inhabitants were receiving water deliveries from 
international humanitarian agencies. The sole spring serving the community had seen its 
winter peak output drop from 30m3/day to 4m3/day in the past five years. Saber Akhurini, 
the Head of the Village Council, attributed this loss to a long-term reduction in rainfall as 
well as the growing extraction of groundwater by residents from the adjoining Israeli 
settlement of Ma’on, established in 1981 on occupied Palestinian land. At-Tuwani’s 
farming community has seen over 1,500 dunums of agricultural land appropriated by the 
settlers, who regularly subject the villagers to physical and verbal assaults: the victims 
include Palestinian children who walk from other villages to At-Tuwani School. Local olive-
pickers and shepherds are continually harassed and have even been shot at from Hill 833, 
an Orthodox Jewish outpost to the east of At-Tuwani. In May 2009, villagers reported that, 
in the previous month, Israeli setters had destroyed the yield from 100 dunums of their 
planted barley and beans.2 No settlers have ever been prosecuted for property destruction 
or violence against the villagers of At-Tuwani. Indeed, the Israeli Civil Administration in 
control of this region recognises only 30 dunums of the original village area of 110 
dunums: outside this narrow space, the local mosque, school and a new Spanish-financed 
community water cistern all face Israeli demolition orders. 
 
It is not surprising that we should encounter high social vulnerability in the occupied 
Palestinian territory (oPt),3 nor that such life experiences largely remain out of sight to the 
                                                 
1
 Interviews conducted by the author with Abdallah Al Tabaneh, Yatta District; and Head of the Hebron Agriculture 
Department, Hebron, both 11 May 2009. The regional description accords with a survey undertaken by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (2009) Assessment of Small Ruminant Breeders in Rural Hebron, Jericho, Bethlehem and 
Ramallah (Jerusalem: FAO). 
2
 Interviews conducted by the author in At-Tuwani Village, 16 December 2008 and 11 May 2009. The scope of Israeli 
settler violence in the region, and elsewhere in the West Bank, has been documented by the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); e.g. OCHA (2008) Unprotected: Israeli Settler Violence Against 
Palestinian Civilians and their Property, Jerusalem: OCHA. 
3
 My use of the term ‘occupied Palestinian territory’ follows the accepted nomenclature employed by the United 
Nations in reference to a series of UN Security Council Resolutions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, beginning with 
Resolution 242 in November 1967. 
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mainstream Western media. Whatever the reasons for this under-reporting, we might 
nevertheless expect that our prevailing notions of social justice would allow us to examine 
the threats to human well-being and alleged abuses of authority noted above, indicating 
that this state of affairs is unlikely to be fair or right. We can draw confidence from the 
knowledge that, at least in the academic world, the most prominent liberal theories of 
justice, as discussed below, reach out and address the interests of those most 
disadvantaged. As several authors in this volume argue convincingly, while there are 
significant challenges in applying our notions of social justice to climate change, we also 
have the theoretical resources to ensure that we can take into account the justice impacts 
of climate stresses for the most vulnerable peoples. Finally, our democratic intuitions 
would insist that justice claims are tested openly, that all evidence is shared and that all 
views are equally respected. 
 
Yet I argue in this chapter that if the litmus test for the moral credibility of a liberal 
framework of social and environmental justice is its ability to accommodate the victims of 
multiple and/or enduring injuries, then it must reckon with the unredeemed justice claims of 
a people under occupation for over 40 years. This is more than the empirical inclusion of a 
particular ledger of grievances; for reasons given below, it disrupts the conceptual 
perimeters of liberal theories of justice – the ‘ends of justice’. By itself, the problem of 
climate vulnerability generates issues about the bounds of justice, including duties to those 
deemed most vulnerable to present and future climate hazards. In the next section, I 
outline the issue of climate vulnerability in poorer countries. This is followed by an 
overview of two leading liberal theories of justice as applied to those most likely to be 
burdened by the impacts of climate change.4 I then show how the Palestinians, who can 
plausibly make claims to being amongst the most vulnerable peoples to climate change, 
nevertheless remain beyond the pale of climate concern – both in a legal and geopolitical 
sense. Their exclusion as legitimate subjects for climate justice demonstrates the arbitrary 
and abrupt delimiting of the international discourse on climate vulnerability. 
 
 
Climate Vulnerability in Developing Countries 
 
For the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), developing countries are the most vulnerable to adverse climate change 
impacts, because they have higher sensitivity and lower adaptive capacity than 
industrialised countries. The UNFCCC obliges Parties to take into account the specific 
needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries in addressing the adverse effects of 
climate change, while the Kyoto Protocol provides a financial mechanism to assist such 
countries in climate adaptation. Under the Nairobi work programme adopted by UNFCCC 
in 2005, developing countries are supported in undertaking vulnerability and adaptation 
assessments to enhance the effectiveness of their responses to climate change and 
variability (UNFCCC 2007: 10-11). Recent interest in climate vulnerability is also shared by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which sponsored an international 
research project – Assessment of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate Change (AIACC) – 
to conduct studies of adaptation and vulnerability in 46 developing countries. 
 
In this important research, vulnerability is taken to mean the propensity of people or 
systems to be harmed by hazards or stresses, which is determined by ‘their exposures to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
4
 ‘Climate change’ here means ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that 
alters the composition of the global atmosphere which is in addition to the natural climate variability observed over 
comparative time periods’ (UNFCCC Article 1.2). 
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hazard[s], their sensitivity to the exposures, and their capacities to resist, cope with, 
exploit, recover from and adapt to the effects’ (Leary et al. 2008, p. 4). There is a claim 
that climate change is changing exposures to climate-related hazards, understood as 
extreme weather events (e.g. flooding, extreme heat, droughts) which may trigger various 
societal shocks (e.g. food productivity falls, population displacements). What the IPCC 
labels ‘key’ vulnerabilities to climate change – those meriting policy attention as 
symptomatic of ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ with the climate system (UNFCCC 
Article 2) – are seen to depend on the magnitude, timing and distribution of climate 
impacts (Schneider et al. 2007, p. 784). While early IPCC formulations favoured 
biophysical framings of climate impacts and ecosystem vulnerability, it is now recognised 
that vulnerability to climate change properly extends to the socio-economic and political 
conditions that affect how communities cope with the impacts of climate-related hazards. 
This has led to a more integrated understanding of vulnerability, which is designed to 
capture the role of non-climatic pressures on individuals and groups who are also facing 
climate hazards (Adger 2006; Patt et al. 2009). This broader vulnerability perspective is 
the one adopted in this chapter. 
 
Climate vulnerability thus denotes the idea of exposure to climate-related hazards in the 
context of biophysical and social vulnerability, as well as in relation to response 
capabilities in both the short-term (coping) and long-term (adaptation). Efforts to derive 
single metrics of vulnerability to global climate (and environmental) change typically falter 
in the face of substantial scientific uncertainties and, more importantly, the value-laden 
nature of vulnerability assessments (Barnett et al. 2008). Vulnerability is about values 
perceived to be at risk by affected communities, who bring diverse preferences and ethical 
judgments to bear in socio-political evaluations of particular climate impacts. As the IPCC 
elaborates, open deliberations on climate impacts are likely to feature value judgments 
about the acceptability of potential risks, and potential adaptation and mitigation 
measures, taking into account such wider themes as development, equity and 
sustainability (Schneider et al. 2007, p. 784). 
 
Equity considerations are unavoidable given the differential vulnerability of populations 
and groups exposed to climate hazards. The IPCC has long maintained that the 
geographical regions at greatest risk tend to be developing countries at low latitudes, 
because of higher susceptibilities to damage. This general claim is supported empirically 
by recent global reviews of climate vulnerability (Leary et al. 2008; Schneider et al. 2007), 
demonstrating that developing countries at low latitudes are particularly vulnerable to 
predicted water resource impacts (e.g. flooding, reduced water availability and quality) and 
food supply impacts (e.g. falls in farming productivity) – impacts which increase in severity 
with greater projected increases in global mean temperature by 2100. However, the 
mapping of aggregate vulnerability patterns in the tropics and subtropics can displace 
scientific and policy attention away from key vulnerabilities facing poorer populations in 
distinctive sub-regions including, for the purposes of this chapter, the eastern 
Mediterranean.  
 
At least in terms of exposure to climate change, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank face disruptive climate impacts alongside the populations of other semi-arid 
territories in Western Asia. In the eastern Mediterranean sub-region, climate predictions 
are compromised by deficits in meteorological data and uncertainties regarding the 
incorporation in climate models of region-specific conditions and processes (Mellouki and 
Ravishankara 2007). Nevertheless, climate simulations recently undertaken with three 
regional models have delivered generally consistent results (GLOWA-Jordan River Project 
2009; Kitoh et al. 2008; Somot et al. 2008). Over the course of this century, and depending 
  4 
on the global emissions scenario employed, there is predicted to be: (i) a decrease in 
precipitation of up to 35% (with significant seasonal variation), (ii) a significant warming of 
between 2.60C and 4.80C, and (iii) a tendency towards more extreme weather events. For 
the population of the oPt, the biophysical impacts expected from these trends include an 
increased probability of flash floods, droughts, desertification and saline intrusion into 
groundwater (Mason, Mimi and Zeitoun 2010, pp. 49-56). 
 
By themselves, of course, climate impacts say little about the vulnerability of affected 
populations or groups. In the scholarship on environmental vulnerability, there is a growing 
interest in the ways in which vulnerability is constituted by multiple processes interacting 
across different spatiotemporal scales. More precisely, hazards acting on people and 
systems are seen to arise from influences outside and inside the area of immediate 
exposure although, given their complexity, their particular character is usually specific to 
that area (Barnett et al. 2008, p. 105; Turner et al. 2003, p. 8077). This conceptual insight 
has far-reaching methodological implications insofar as vulnerability analysis is thereby 
compelled to engage with human-biophysical conditions and dynamics that spiral out from 
locales and regions of high-level concern. Arguably, these implications have still to be fully 
grasped. For example, a common finding in the AIACC work on climate change and 
vulnerability was that socio-economic and political processes are pivotal in accounting for 
the harm caused by climate impacts, but these non-climatic drivers were mainly derived by 
comparing discrete national-level studies (Leary 2008). A revealing contrast is provided by 
Roberts and Parks (2007, pp. 103-132), who undertook a cross-national analysis of over 
4,000 climate disasters from 1980-2002 to test proximate and structural causes of human 
vulnerability: their contention that the root causes of climate vulnerability lie in enduring 
constraints on the development space of poorer countries invites the critical scrutiny of 
global political and economic structures. 
 
Indeed, the climate vulnerability of developing countries is inseparable from, and 
exacerbates, global disparities in wealth and relative power: the most disadvantaged face 
a disproportionate burden of climate-related risks even though they are least responsible 
for contributing to dangerous levels of greenhouse gases, and have received little or no 
benefit from the economic activities causing climate change (Vanderheiden 2008, p. 78). 
In the next section, I summarise the challenges to two competing liberal theories of social 
justice posed by the high levels of climate vulnerability experienced by populations in 
many poorer countries. I argue that, while these justice frameworks profess to have 
conceptual resources to register the justice claims of those most disadvantaged, there are 
critical domains of climate vulnerability that escape their reach. 
 
 
Climate Vulnerability and the Ends of Liberal Justice 
 
Under the UNFCCC, the overriding duty imposed on Parties is that they prevent 
dangerous interference with the climate system (Article 2). Arguably the main articulation 
of justice pertinent to differential climate vulnerability relates to the legal acknowledgment 
in the Convention of the inequitable impact of climate change within and across 
generations, including the recognition that measures for mitigation and adaptation also 
entail different allocations of costs between states. UNFCCC Article 3(1) expresses 
succinctly the normative idea informing these concerns: 
 
 The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
 generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
 common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, 
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 the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change 
 and the adverse effects thereof. 
 
There is a general understanding of distributive justice at work here, which divides 
obligations for action on the basis that industrialised (Annex I) Parties are both more 
culpable for global warming and have greater capacity for limiting anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases and adapting to the harms caused by climate change. The concept of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, which is also invoked in the Preamble and 
Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol, has wider currency in international environmental law. 
While the principle sets broad parameters for international burden-sharing on climate 
change action, its justice-oriented implications for UNFCCC Parties nevertheless remain 
under-specified (Brunnée 2009, pp. 324-328): this is evident in conflicting interpretations 
between industrialised and developing country Parties over the nature and scope of 
assistance due to vulnerable populations regarding climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. 
 
These disagreements not only indicate that international climate negotiations have left 
unresolved divergent interpretations of equity under the UNFCCC framework, they also 
point to treaty commitments which reveal the inequitable treatment of vulnerable 
developing countries. In the first place, the asymmetry of bargaining power in climate 
negotiations is manifest in the greater decision costs borne by participating poorer 
countries, whose shortcomings in technical and administrative capacity are reinforced by 
their political marginalisation in the global political order. This suggests a procedural 
injustice at odds with the international legal norm prescribing equality of treatment for 
sovereign states (Roberts and Parks 2007, pp. 14-19). Secondly, while the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities would seem fairly to oblige industrialised country 
Parties to be the first to undertake reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, its 
operationalisation in the Kyoto Protocol has also triggered distributive injustices to poorer 
countries. For example, the designation of 1990 as a base year for emission reduction 
commitments under the Protocol exempts greenhouse gas emissions preceding this 
starting-point to the obvious advantage of countries already industrialised.5 Similarly, the 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, which is designed to foster green technology 
investment in developing country Parties, is arguably constraining the economic 
development space in these states, insofar as transnational companies are investing in 
carbon reduction opportunities that may not reflect host country economic priorities 
(Schreuder 2009, pp. 191-193). 
 
Can those liberal theories of justice featuring egalitarian maxims find normative space for 
those most disadvantaged by climate change? If we turn to John Rawls’s (1999a) theory of 
justice – the seminal modern expression of social contract theory – there is, of course, in 
the difference principle an explicit rule for the structure of society that justifies inequalities 
only if they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.6 The difference principle 
applies to the allocation of so-called primary social goods (e.g. income and wealth, rights 
and liberties), the distribution of which is deemed necessary for citizens to participate fully 
in society. While Rawls said little on environmental problems, it has been suggested that a 
healthy environment should be included as one such primary good in his schema of justice 
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 To be sure, there is a moral case for selecting this base year, which is that, prior to 1990, polluting states can claim 
‘excusable ignorance’ in not being aware of the climate harm being caused by otherwise legal economic activities 
conducted by their nationals. However, this defence becomes less plausible by 1990 when the IPCC released its First 
Assessment Report, setting out clearly the nature and scope of human-induced climate change. On ‘excusable 
ignorance’ see Caney (2005: 761-762). 
6
 This is within a society in which basic liberties for all are extensive and protected (Rawls 1999a: 52-56). 
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(e.g. Bell 2004a). Yet, as Vanderheiden (2008, p. 79) argues, the capacity of the 
atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gases at safe levels for human well-being is essentially 
a finite good, and current atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases preclude the 
equalisation move recommended by Rawls where there is pronounced inequality; that is, 
maximising the allowances of the primary good to the least advantaged. Even if we accept 
atmospheric absorptive capacity as a primary good, historic inequalities in global 
greenhouse gas emissions could, under the difference principle, invite carbon-intensive 
allowance transfers that would be unsafe for human well-being. To retain the egalitarian 
intent of the difference principle but also effectively to address climate change, the 
irreversibility of dangerous climate change justifies instead regulatory priority being given 
to dramatic curbs on the carbon footprint of industrialised countries, accompanied by 
substantial adaptation assistance to vulnerable populations. 
 
The Rawlsian theory of justice also falters in the face of the spatio-temporal dynamics of 
climate change. Significantly, Rawls judged the difference principle not to be applicable 
between states, deriving principles of international justice from what liberal and nonliberal 
societies would find to be mutually acceptable for global co-existence (1999b). This 
includes the assumption that states are responsible for the environmental integrity of their 
territories, although there is no obligation for international environmental cooperation. As 
Bell (2004b, pp. 142-143) observes, this renders the Rawlsian global compact ill-suited to 
addressing climate change, as the common property attributes of the global atmosphere 
are simply ignored. Furthermore, the one principle of international co-existence from this 
framework that might give moral consideration to the plight of populations with high climate 
vulnerability – the duty to assist other peoples burdened by unfavourable conditions 
(Rawls 1999b, pp. 105-113) – is restricted to institutional capacity-building: the toleration of 
global inequalities of wealth under Rawls’s ‘law of peoples’ blunts the effectiveness of this 
principle as a means of allocating the costs of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
(Bell 2004b, p. 145).7 
 
If the Rawlsian framework struggles with the spatial extension of distributive justice to 
climate harms, there is at least the prospect of environmental justice between generations. 
From his domestic specification of a social contract, Rawls (1999a, pp. 251-259) posits a 
principle of ‘just savings’ – that mutually disinterested individuals, in the original position, 
would agree that it is rational for them to pass to succeeding generations both reasonably 
just institutions and also a level of capital and wealth sufficient to meet the social minimum 
for the least advantaged. Present generations would agree to this, he claims, by their 
representation of family lines (with duties to their immediate descendants) and a wish that 
all earlier generations in their domestic society had followed the principle. The just savings 
principle includes constraints on current consumption to conserve and regenerate the 
capacity of the natural world to sustain its human population (1999b, p. 107), which leads 
some to register its relevance for determining inter-temporal climate justice (Brunnée 
2009: 321). However, the long-term, cumulative onset of global climate change disrupts 
the model of a neat succession of national governments or populations preserving safe 
climatic conditions for their own vulnerable descendants. Simon Caney has pinpointed this 
inter-generational loss of control of climate benefits and burdens, with domestic 
populations affected by the decisions of previous members of other societies (2006, p. 
273). Indeed, until recently, populations could not even have recognised the climate harm 
to future generations being caused by carbon-intensive pathways of economic 
development. Thus, the just savings principle cannot capture essential facets of justice to 
climate vulnerable future generations. 
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 For a similarly restrained notion of international justice, which locates ‘residual responsibilities’ to vulnerable foreign 
populations, see David Miller (2007) National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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Climate vulnerability seems thus to fall outside the moral parameters of Rawlsian social 
justice. What of the major liberal egalitarian alternative to social contract theory – the 
capabilities approach associated above all with the work of Martha Nussbaum (2006) 
Amartya Sen (2009)? The capabilities perspective understands global (and domestic) 
social justice in terms of social entitlements compatible with the equal dignity of human 
beings, where people are able adequately to secure minimal thresholds of core 
capabilities. These core capabilities are freedoms to accomplish things deemed necessary 
for a dignified life, such as being able to achieve bodily health and integrity, as well as 
control over one’s environment (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 76-78). For Nussbaum, being able to 
live with concern for and in relation to animal, plants, and the world of nature is a core 
capability, although she examines its justice implications with reference to the species-
specific entitlements of animals rather than any analysis of climate change or other global 
ecological interdependencies. Nevertheless, the capabilities approach has been employed 
by Wolf and de-Shalit to address those involuntary social and environmental risks which, 
they claim, entrench disadvantage for vulnerable people. Drawing on almost 100 extended 
interviews conducted in Israel and Britain, Wolf and de-Shalit contend that exceptional 
vulnerability compounds disadvantage by compelling individuals to undertake harmful 
coping strategies, giving as one example the plight of poor Bedouin herders in Southern 
Israel exposed routinely to contaminated water, because of constraints on their ability to 
move and control over their political environment (2007, pp. 67-68).8 
 
Surprisingly, Wolf and de-Shalit do not consider the role of global and transnational flows 
of harm in entrenching social disadvantage, which weakens their commentary on 
environmental justice. Where capability theorists have considered the value of their 
approach for tackling global inequalities, the Rawlsian focus on primary goods serves as a 
foil: capabilities are viewed as a richer conceptual repertoire for locating social positions 
than resources alone, reflected in an outcomes interest in human development rather than 
wealth creation and transfer (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 283-284; Sen 2009, pp. 260-263). 
Nussbaum has provided the fullest account of a capabilities perspective on global justice, 
arguing for a global equality of opportunity in which a minimum threshold level of 
capabilities, for all persons, extends beyond national political communities to humanity as 
a whole (2006, pp. 291-295). In the most developed account of her position, global 
warming is briefly mentioned as an example of a type of collective harm that justifies the 
allocation of institutional responsibilities to states and corporations for promoting human 
capabilities across national boundaries; and effective international environmental 
regulation is presented as one of the necessary layers of a ‘thin system’ of decentralised 
global governance for protecting core human capabilities (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 308, 320). 
Nussbaum’s principles for a minimally just global order include also a priority principle 
directed at poor and developing countries – that there is a substantial redistribution of 
resources from prosperous nations to poorer nations. In this way the capabilities approach 
has a greater redistributive ambition at the global level than the Rawlsian approach. 
 
At the inter-generational level, there is also the claim that the capabilities perspective can 
better protect the ecological well-being of future generations than invoking a just savings 
principle or the kindred (Brundtland) notion of sustainable development – that the needs of 
the present generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs. Sen (2009, pp. 248-252) argues that environmental sustainability 
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 For a work (Wolf and de-Shalit 2007) preoccupied in part with the least advantaged in Israel, those subject to Israeli 
occupation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are conspicuously absent: Palestinians are glimpsed only fleetingly – as 
suicide bombers, Kassam missile launchers or, at best, the clients of paternalistic concern by Israeli NGOs. 
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should be reconfigured to encompass sustainable freedom – the preservation or 
expansion of current freedoms and capabilities without compromising the capabilities of 
future generations. In other words, each generation acts as a trustee for the core 
capabilities of succeeding generations. This suggestion has the virtue of integrating 
environmental protection considerations into human development thinking: it would 
therefore seem appropriate for capturing the hybrid socio-ecological character of climate 
vulnerability. As with social contract theory, though, it is by no means clear that a 
capabilities approach can grasp the particular risk profile of climate change, including the 
non-substitutable sink capacity of the atmosphere in regards to greenhouse gases (and 
other pollutants). As there is no priority accorded in the capabilities approach to the 
ecological conditions necessary for human survival (as might be provided, for example, by 
a human right not to suffer from the disadvantages caused by climate change: Caney 
2005), there is little guidance available on how to address the inevitable tensions and 
trade-offs between the capabilities of the present vulnerable and the future vulnerable. In a 
world of escalating climate adaptation costs and global governance failure on climate 
change, this leaves the capabilities perspective seemingly unable to generate special 
obligations of climate justice. 
 
The brief overview above of two prominent liberal perspectives on social justice suggests 
that, despite their egalitarian intentions and interests in wider communities of justice 
(transnational and inter-generational), climate vulnerability is not yet ensconced within the 
scope of their moral concern. I have highlighted conceptual challenges associated, above 
all, with the unprecedented threat of dangerous climate change (as defined by the IPCC), 
particularly to the least advantaged. In the last section of this chapter, I indicate how one 
population with high climate vulnerability remains beyond the geopolitical pale of 
international climate concern. The Palestinian ‘exception’ to the UNFCCC discourse on 
climate responsibility exposes vividly the moral shortfall in its constituent norms of climate 
harm prevention and procedural equity. 
 
 
The Occupied Palestinian Territory: Beyond the Pale of (Climate) Concern 
 
Across all fields of human security, the high social vulnerability of the Palestinian people is 
widely acknowledged by the international community. Following the end of the Second 
Intifada in 2005, expectations were raised that socio-economic conditions would improve 
in the West Bank and Gaza, but recent trends reveal instead a sharp deterioration. UN 
surveys indicate a deepening of poverty: by 2008 48% of Palestinians in the West Bank 
and 70% in Gaza were judged to live below the poverty line (UNDP/PAPP 2009; see also 
UNRWA 2009). There are also serious problems concerning secure access to affordable 
food and water. In 2008 25% of the West Bank population and 56% of the Gaza 
population were deemed by the Food and Agriculture Organization to be food secure 
(FAO 2008), while the daily water consumption for three-quarters of Palestinians was 
estimated to be 60-100 litres per person for domestic use (Zeitoun 2008, p. 14), which 
compares with a WHO minimal daily standard of 100 litres per person for direct 
consumptive and hygiene needs. According to the United Nations Development 
Programme, food and water insecurity in the oPt are likely to be exacerbated by 
forecasted climate change, on account of worsening environmental conditions for the 
domestic agricultural sector (which consumes 66% of Palestinian withdrawn water) and a 
fragile water supply infrastructure. For both the agriculture and water sectors the political 
and economic constraints of a belligerent occupation severely restrict the development of 
Palestinian resilience to present and future climate hazards (Mason, Mimi and Zeitoun 
2010). 
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Of course, it is the fact of belligerent occupation that renders Palestinian climate 
vulnerabilities legally beyond the pale of responsibility of Israel and the international 
community. In the first place, this has to do with the contested scope of international 
humanitarian law within the oPt, which Israel maintains is not de jure applicable to the 
West Bank and Gaza, while at the same time undertaking to comply de facto with the 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and customary law governing belligerent 
occupation (Dinstein 2009, pp. 20-25). The stance of the international community is less 
ambiguous: the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the oPt – including the 
designation of Israel as an occupying power – has consistently been affirmed by the High 
Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention, as well as the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). However, as I note below, even the acknowledgment that international 
humanitarian obligations hold in the West Bank and Gaza leaves little space for the 
consideration of environmental justice claims by the occupied. 
 
Secondly, Palestinians are physically cast away from, and beyond, dignified treatment by 
literal pales, which recall the derivation of the noun from palus (stake) as a protective 
fence defending a settlement. For Israel this refers to various material manifestations of a 
‘security fence’ or barrier complex constructed first along the border with Gaza in 1987 in 
response to the First Intifada, and then, since 2002, a Separation Barrier from the West 
Bank (eventually to reach a planned 763km), running mostly within the Palestinian side of 
the Green Line, encompassing major Israeli settlements in occupied territory. Outside the 
constitutional protections afforded to Israeli citizens are the Emergency Regulations 
imposed on the oPt: these empower the State of Israel to declare closed military areas, 
exercise arrest without trial, expel and even execute individuals (Pappe 2008, p. 148). The 
Emergency Regulations have given rise to a pervasive set of controls and movement 
restrictions which intrude into Palestinian daily life. Gazans also face economic sanctions 
and a blockade, imposed after the January 2006 victory of Hamas in the Palestinian 
Legislative Elections, then tightened further in September 2007 following the declaration 
by Israel that the Gaza Strip was a ‘hostile entity’. Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli military 
offensive of December 2008-January 2009 in the Gaza Strip, was only the most recent, 
albeit shocking, example of how Palestinians have been collectively exposed to the 
securitised and highly asymmetrical effects of occupation.9 
 
It is recognised in international law that states have a legitimate right to protect their 
populations, and the State of Israel has consistently invoked self-defence to justify its 
extensive use of coercive force against Palestinians perceived to threaten its citizens, 
though even the US has been uncomfortable with the Israeli propensity to favour 
disproportionate military actions. The routine use of violence against Palestinians by the 
Israeli state unsettles the assumption of liberal justice theories that constitutional 
democracies are inherently pacific (e.g. Rawls 1999b: 8). Indeed, Israel has been 
presented as a prime example of the ‘state of exception’ taken to be constitutive of the 
Western political system; that is, the unexamined foundation of political authority on 
unaccountable sovereign violence (Agamben 2005). Those individuals and groups 
excluded from membership of the state (the exiled and the bandits) serve at the same time 
to constitute the ‘other’ by which the normalcy of national citizens is measured. It is not 
difficult to view the treatment of Palestinians in these terms, reaching back to the exiled 
and refugees of 1948, recording the displaced of 1967 and then registering more recent 
                                                 
9
 While Israel has stated that, with its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005, its status as an 
occupying power there has finished, it still retains effective control of the Strip, and acknowledged in the 2003 Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement that the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitute a single territorial unit: Israel therefore 
remains bound by international humanitarian obligations regarding belligerent occupation (Dinstein 2009: 276-280). 
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victims of Israeli state and settler violence (e.g. Lentin 2008; Hanafi 2009). The state of 
exception of Israel’s constant emergency footing has justified multiple contraventions of 
international humanitarian law, such as the domestic incarceration of 8,000 Palestinians, 
many without charge or under military detention orders. In the midst of the ‘war on terror’, 
which has seen liberal democracies suspend civil liberties and freely scatter derogations 
from due legal process, the enduring state of exception in Israel and the oPt seems to 
have been confirmed as the juridical paradigm of Western political authority. 
 
Proponents of the state of exception thesis treat as hypocritical any liberal formulation of 
international justice that does not concede the bogus universalism of its appeals to a 
common humanity. Yet it is the existence of cosmopolitan norms in international law that at 
least gives moral weight to the justice claims of those vulnerable to social and 
environmental injury. Thus, the prospects for international distributive justice in assisting 
Palestinians to meet climate adaptation burdens caused by other global actors finds 
support in those harm prevention rules with currency in international humanitarian and 
environmental law. For example, customary and treaty-based humanitarian obligations on 
Israel as an occupying power oblige it to not to degrade or destroy property and resources 
indispensable to the survival of the Palestinian population, including agricultural areas, 
drinking water installations and irrigation works. Any such infrastructure oriented to food 
and water security becomes more critical should climate change significantly increase the 
physical scarcity of water, especially if movement restrictions continue to restrict economic 
development options for the oPt. From an international environmental law perspective, 
Palestinians already benefit indirectly from UNFCCC obligations on Parties effectively to 
prevent dangerous climate change. Insofar as customary norms of environmental harm 
prevention are acknowledged as pertaining to climate change, the high climate 
vulnerability of the oPt would justify also international assistance for Palestinian adaptation 
measures as a form of direct damage prevention (Verheyen 2005, p. 35). 
 
The weak enforceability both of international humanitarian and environmental law is of 
course the key institutional deficiency hindering the reach of cosmopolitan rules of harm 
prevention. At the level of state responsibility, international obligations to assist climate 
adaptation are more practically relevant to the immediate well-being of the Palestinians 
that states’ mitigation duties under the UNFCCC. In the absence of Israeli compliance with 
key humanitarian obligations – including those pertaining to food and water security – the 
international community continues to pour substantial aid into the oPt, committing $4.48 
billion in March 2009 at the donors conference in Sharm el-Sheikh to assist vulnerable 
sections of the Palestinian population and to carry on strengthening the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA). The need to address climate risks barely registers in these donor 
commitments, even though international humanitarian organisations have now identified 
climate change as the most important emerging humanitarian challenge for the global 
community (OCHA/IFC/WFP 2009). Humanitarian assistance in support of Palestinian 
adaptation to climate change would logically target the disaster risk reduction capacity of 
the PNA, which suffers from a number of structural weaknesses (Al-Dalbeek 2008). 
Integrating climate risks in national disaster risk reduction is necessary for building climate 
resilience in the oPt, but would inevitably be compromised by the far-reaching limits to 
administrative and judicial authority of the PNA set by the Israeli occupation. This 
unyielding reality perpetuates both the need for, and ultimate ineffectiveness of, 
international assistance to the Palestinians (Le More 2008). 
 
The high thresholds of (potential) harm necessary to trigger state obligations under 
international humanitarian and environmental law leave unchecked the ongoing effects of 
the occupation that serve to increase the climate vulnerability of Palestinians. Some of 
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these arise from Israel’s de facto control of Palestinian natural resources – from Gazan 
fisheries and natural gas reserves to the groundwater supplies of the three transboundary 
aquifers underlying the West Bank.10 Combined with the numerous restrictions on the free 
movement of goods and people, this control smothers development pathways out of 
vulnerability. For example, to take the critical issue of physical water scarcity forecast to 
increase under climate change, Israel consumes six times the Palestinian withdrawal from 
shared freshwater resources (Zeitoun 2008, pp. 57-58). For the crucial Western Aquifer 
Basin, which is the largest groundwater resource between the two territories, Israeli 
prohibition of new Palestinian wells and access restrictions to existing Palestinian wells 
caught on the Israeli side of the Separation Barrier are significantly reducing supplies of 
agricultural water for the northern West Bank (Trottier 2007, p. 121). Sari Hanafi (2009), 
who subscribes to the state of exception theory, has termed ‘spacio-cide’ the creeping 
dispossession and degradation by Israel of Palestinian living spaces, which he claims has 
undermined the material conditions of a viable Palestinian state. Spacio-cide also disables 
the means by which Palestinians have historically coped with climate hazards, e.g. 
changes in agricultural land use, settlement locations and livelihood choices during times 
of drought; and which, with an end to occupation, could serve as cultural templates for 
effective adaption to new climate stresses (Mason, Mimi and Zeitoun 2010). The Israeli 
erosion of the material and social conditions by which Palestinians cope with climate (and 
other) hazards has unjust consequences for the distribution of adaptation costs between 
the two territories, yet its insidious agency slips past the watch of international norms of 
humanitarian and environmental harm prevention. 
 
The humanitarian safeguards against harm offered by the international law of belligerent 
occupation operate in acknowledged conditions of coercion – the civilian population has 
not consented to be occupied. In a protracted period of occupation, as for the oPt, this 
suggests the firm exclusion of the occupied from international procedural justice in the 
sense of their participation and recognition as citizens of a sovereign state with formal 
equality in the global community. Just as norms of environmental protection are sidelined 
by the particular (lex specialis) rules governing military occupation under the laws of war, 
political norms of collective self-determination and human autonomy seem effectively 
suspended. Avoiding here the state of exception rests on the expectation that the 
international community will make good its commitment to facilitate a comprehensive 
Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement where two democratic states live side by side in peace 
with recognised borders (e.g. UNSC Resolution 1850). Prior to any such final settlement, 
is there any scope for the Palestinians to determine collectively their own climate 
vulnerability with a view, if necessary, to seeking adaptation assistance from the 
international community? 
 
It is the absence of state sovereignty for the Palestinians that precludes their political 
representatives from signing up to, and participating in, the UNFCCC – the most important 
international regime for allocating state duties regarding climate change mitigation and 
adaptation. To be sure, following the proclamation of the ‘State of Palestine’ by the 
Palestinian National Council in November 1988, ‘Palestine’ was recognised as an entity by 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA Resolution 43/177) and has since been afforded rights 
and privileges of participation in the work of the UN system (UNGA Resolution 52/250). 
This unique diplomatic identity – between a non-state and a state – has allowed PNA 
actors to represent the oPt in areas where they have particular expertise and authority; 
thus the Palestinian Environmental Quality Authority participates as an observer in a 
                                                 
10
 This de facto control stands opposed to the principle that an occupied population retains permanent sovereignty over 
its natural wealth and resources, as stated for the oPt in UN General Assembly Resolution 305 in December 1972: see 
Okowa (2009: 244-245). 
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number of multilateral environmental agreements (e.g. the 1994 UN Desertification 
Convention and the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean). 
Supported by the Arab League, the PNA has sought Palestinian observer status at the 
UNFCCC, but so far with little success:11 there has been little appetite, outside Arab 
Parties to the Convention, to pull the highly charged issue of Palestinian climate 
vulnerability within the orbit of a treaty sustained still by a fragile global consensus 
between Northern and Southern states. As the occupying power in the oPt, and also a 
Party to the UNFCCC, Israel could reasonably be expected to represent the interests of 
the Palestinian population in avoiding climate-related harm forecast to affect vital interests 
in water and food security, but the issue of Palestinian climate vulnerability is absent from 
Israeli national statements on adaptation to climate change (e.g. Office of the Chief 
Scientist 2008). Without any direct representation, on an ongoing basis, within the 
UNFCCC of Palestinian vulnerability to climate-related harm, they remain beyond the pale 
of the international climate regime – frozen out, for example, from access to the financial 
mechanisms available under the UNFCCC to support climate adaptation activities in 
poorer countries. 
 
The procedural injustice that is the exclusion of Palestinian representatives and interests 
from the international climate regime is founded, of course, on a more general denial of 
national self-determination. It has been noted that participatory failings in global decision-
making on climate change are intertwined with the lack of recognition of the needs of 
vulnerable peoples (Paavola, Adger and Huq 2006). In the Palestinian case, where ethnic 
identity has been forged by collective and individual experiences of oppression, injury and 
humiliation at the hands of an occupier – one whose own singular ethnic ideology 
(Zionism) precludes the treatment of Palestinians as equals – cultural recognition is 
fraught with violence. This is the case internally as well as externally: the political and often 
bloody polarisation of the population into factions – pro- and anti-PNA, secular versus 
religious, refugee versus non-refugee – has frustrated moves to present a unified 
governing authority (Jamal 2007). The efforts of the international community have often 
made matters worse: the ongoing dependence of the Palestinians on substantial flows of 
humanitarian and development assistance has fostered corrupt, clientelistic networks, as 
well as bending domestic institutions to donor preferences and political interests. It would 
be unwise to imagine that the development of a Palestinian position on climate justice 
would not be affected by these broader political currents and power relationships. Yet, the 
international community is obliged at least to recognise the right of Palestinian political 
representatives to address the potentially dangerous impacts of climate change on their 
vulnerable population. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
So over-determined is the vulnerability of Palestinians to physical and psychological harm 
that consideration of the dangerous effects from potential climate change represents, 
paradoxically, an entitlement – the luxury to attend to impacts to well-being that are 
uncertain and diffuse. As noted above, climate scientists do forecast disruptive biophysical 
impacts for the eastern Mediterranean, by the end of the century, as a result of climate 
change, yet these predictions are dwarfed into insignificance by the immediate and 
enduring injuries caused by the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, it is 
practically irrelevant to Palestinians if the climate hazards they face are ultimately caused 
                                                 
11
 Palestine was granted observer status at the UNFCCC COP 15 meeting at Copenhagen in December 2009, but with 
no access to the formal negotiations and no prospect of a more permanent observer status in the international climate 
convention. 
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or by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (climate change) or are the expressions of 
‘natural climate variability’: both are the effects of intangible forces outside their control. 
The international allocation of mitigation and adaptation responsibilities under the 
UNFCCC is a justice concern for this population only insofar as those states more culpable 
for global warming, and/or more capable of assisting poorer countries, might be obliged to 
assist Palestinians in becoming more resilient to dangerous climate change. However, for 
reasons already given, Palestinians are beyond the pale of the UNFCCC process: their 
statelessness ensures their formal exclusion from the international regime (including 
access to climate adaptation financing), while their contentious political subjectivity is 
viewed by key Convention Parties as toxic to the fragile global consensus on climate 
action. 
  
As discussed in this chapter, liberal theorists of justice with egalitarian credentials have 
conceptual resources for bringing the least advantaged into the fold of moral concern, but 
are found wanting when confronted both with the problem structure of climate change and 
the challenge of a protracted belligerent occupation. Both conditions are under-examined 
in liberal political theory, and when these circumstance converge, as with the climate 
vulnerability of the Palestinians, the limitations are compounded. In contrast, Giorgio 
Agamben’s (2005) ‘state of exception’ thesis seems to give theoretical justification to 
conditions beyond the legal and moral pale of liberal justice: here the exceptional case 
unmasks the unacknowledged conditions of conventional political authority, notably the 
arbitrary violence of a ‘force of law without law’ (Agamben 2005, p. 39) against those seen 
as threatening the security of the state. And it is the nature of Israel as a security state, 
under a constant emergency footing, that gives force to claims that it embodies a state of 
exception in its domestic polity and its occupation of the Palestinian territory. There is, of 
course, also a globalisation of violence that feeds into, and out from, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and structures the production of Palestinian (and Israeli) vulnerabilities.12 However, 
the normative cost of Agamben’s theory arguably outweighs its critical intent, for there is 
no escape from the state of exception, no prospect of justice. Indeed, its philosophical 
erasure of autonomous agency is, arguably, theoretically more corrosive than the 
weaknesses of egalitarian liberal approaches. Much needs to be done to rework the latter 
to make space for the consideration of, and engagement with, the injustices of climate 
vulnerability. 
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